



Security in Critical Infrastructures

Challenges and the Road ahead

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About me




- Assistant Professor at SUTD, interested in:
 - Information flow analysis
 - Security testing
 - Security in Cyber-physical systems
- Past:
 - Post-doc at the TU Munich.
 - Researcher and consultant at Siemens CT in Munich.
 - PhD in Computer Science at TU Dortmund.
 - Mathematics in Munich and Rome.
 - Systems Engineering in CR.

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State of affairs

- Increasingly interconnected, software dependent critical infrastructures.
 - Electricity distribution, Water treatment and distribution, Financial services, Healthcare etc.



State of affairs

- Evidence of attacks in the wild
 - Highly sophisticated malware (Stuxnet and co.)
 - Increase of sophisticated attacks against CI.




Securing Your Journey
to the Cloud



Organization of
American States

Cyber Security of Critical
Infrastructures in the
Americas



Role of academia

- In general, topic on its own (philosophy of science)
- In my view, in the context of cyber security of CI:
 - Understand reality
 - What is going on? What is being attacked? Who is attacking? How are they attacking?
 - Propose solutions
 - How can we solve existing problems? Can we make CI more secure?



Critical infrastructures

- Historically CI engineering had focused on safety as opposed to security.
- Assumption was that an adversary had to bypass certain physical security to attack.
- Many CIs not built by computer scientist but by electric/electronic engineers.
- Proprietary systems, designs usually secret.



Security as a science

- On the positive side, some lessons learned in security:
 - Kerckhoff's principle: security by design vs. security by obscurity [Kerckhoff].
 - Selected Secure Development principles [Viega & McGraw]
 - Secure the weakest link.
 - Practice defence in depth.
 - Security is often not a boolean property, but is relative to capacity of adversary

Risk analysis for security?

- Risk notions
 - Impact: in some cases clear.
 - Likelihood?
- Security vs. Safety:
 - Intelligent threat vs. pure chance
- Cost vs. Risk?






Security as a science

- Security != cryptography
- But cryptography offers fundamental building blocks
- P vs NP?
 - Formulation of the problem is from the 1970's
 - Solution guarantees 1M USD (Millenium problem).
 - Tightly linked to rigorous foundations of modern crypto. [Arora & Barak]



Challenges

- What do we mean by security?
 - Research challenges:
 - What exactly should be secured in critical infrastructures?
 - What are good attacker models?
 - Is the cost of countermeasures justified?



Challenges

- For historical reasons, in most Cls security is an after-thought (if at all).
 - Research challenges:
 - Short term: how can we make running systems (more) secure without having to rebuild them?
 - Future: how should we design secure Cls from scratch?




Challenges

- Even if CIs have security element by design, how should we cope with changes in the threat landscape?
 - 0-days.
 - broken primitives (hash functions, encryption functions).



Challenges

- How can we evaluate the security of CI designs?
 - Formal proofs?
 - Simulations?
 - What is the “correct” attacker model?



Challenges

- How can we evaluate the security of CI implementations?
 - Automated testing based on design?
 - Pen-testing?
 - Again, what is the “correct” attacker model?




Road ahead

- What we are doing at SUTD
 - Considering all of the above.
 - Interdisciplinary approach.
 - Testing attacker models and defence mechanism against state of the art test-beds.
 - Deriving designs for secure Cls.

SWaT Testbed at SUTD



<http://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/research/testbeds/>



Road ahead

- Awareness is critical!
 - Teaching at undergrad and graduate levels.
 - Theory and practice of security.
 - Next generations need to thoroughly understand challenges and existing solutions, and be able to cope with upcoming challenges.



Conclusions

- Many challenges but exciting research ahead.
- Interdisciplinary research is critical.
- Awareness and training are key.
- Security is (most likely) an infinite game!

References

- [Kerckhoff] A. Kerckhoff, "La cryptographie militaire" Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–83, January 1883, pp. 161–191, February 1883.
- [Viega & McGraw] Viega, J., & McGraw, G. (2001). Building Secure Software: How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way, Portable Documents. Pearson Education.
- [Arora & Barak] Arora, S., & Barak, B. (2009). Computational complexity: a modern approach. Cambridge University Press.